Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
Alternativ können Sie versuchen, selbst über Ihren lokalen Bibliothekskatalog auf das gewünschte Dokument zuzugreifen.
Bei Zugriffsproblemen kontaktieren Sie uns gern.
38 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Routledge advances in European politics 71
1. Introduction -- 2. EU foreign policy and conflict management -- 3. The EU's piecemeal involvement in Transnistria -- 4. The EU's reluctant engagement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- 5. The EU's non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh -- 6. Conclusions : the EU's involvement and reluctance.
In: Routledge advances in European politics, 71
`The present book provides the ultimate guide to the EU's performance in conflict management in the post-Soviet space. This is not a book written based on research in a warm office. Nicu Popescu has criss-crossed the conflict regions. The book shows in minute detail how much the EU has progressed in becoming a conflict management actor, but also how difficult and contradictory that process still is.'
In: CEPS working document 260
World Affairs Online
In: Occasional paper 60
World Affairs Online
In: Russian politics and law, Band 50, Heft 4, S. 37-50
ISSN: 1558-0962
In: Journal of democracy, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 46-54
ISSN: 1086-3214
Abstract:
Adrift without the ideological compass of Soviet communism, almost every political force in post-Soviet Russia has flirted at one time or another with nationalism. Russia's disputed December 2011 parliamentary elections triggered the biggest popular protests in the country of the past two decades. One of the most striking and unexpected features of these events was the partnership of liberals and nationalists in the ranks of the protesters. It is not clear how long the cooperation between these two groups will persist, but the extent to which they are able to join their efforts is likely to have a critical effect on the future of Russian politics.
In: Journal of democracy, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 46-54
ISSN: 1086-3214
Adrift without the ideological compass of Soviet communism, almost every political force in post-Soviet Russia has flirted at one time or another with nationalism. Russia's disputed December 2011 parliamentary elections triggered the biggest popular protests in the country of the past two decades. One of the most striking and unexpected features of these events was the partnership of liberals and nationalists in the ranks of the protesters. It is not clear how long the cooperation between these two groups will persist, but the extent to which they are able to join their efforts is likely to have a critical effect on the future of Russian politics. Adapted from the source document.
In: Russian politics and law: a journal of translations, Band 50, Heft 4, S. 37-51
ISSN: 1061-1940
In: Journal of democracy, Band 23, Heft 3, S. 46-55
ISSN: 1045-5736
In: MICROCON Policy Working Paper No. 15
SSRN
Working paper
In: European foreign affairs review, Band 14, Heft 4, S. 457-477
ISSN: 1875-8223
Abstract. The article deals with the European Union (EU) policy toward the post-Soviet secessionist conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-arabakh. The article argues that, in order to understand the EU as a crisis management actor, one has to study not just the patterns of EU intervention in conflict resolution and the impact of its actions but also EU decision not to intervene. These have a huge explanatory potential for the understanding of the EU as a foreign policy actor. Thus the article analyses in detail not just what the EU does vis-à-vis the post-Soviet secessionist conflicts but also what it failed to do. It analyses EU decisions to appoint special envoys, send civilian crisis management operations and offer assistance to the conflict zones, but also draws lessons from EU's refusal to consider the deployment of peacekeepers or the avoidance of conflict resolution strategies, which might upset Russia. The article concludes that EU intervention in conflict resolution is primarily driven by external constraints or opportunities rather than strategic design. When faced with a choice for possible intervention in conflict settlement, the EU tends to opt for the easier, rather than the necessary, foreign policy measures and tends to work around the hard issues of conflict resolution.
In: CEPS Policy Brief No. 199
SSRN